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MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
AND COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS 
RELATING TO THE 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
EMEKA DURUIGBO' 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A major problem of international law is the translation of legal 
provisions into actual practice by states. Over the years, various 
approaches have evolved as mechanisms for ensuring compliance with 
international oil pollution standards. These approaches, described in this 
article as "traditional" as they have been in place for a relatively long 
period of time, are flag, coastal, and port states' jurisdiction. I A flag state 
is a state in whose registry a ship is registered. Although both coastal and 
port states occupy the seashore, port states possess the distinguishing 
feature that ships visit and use of its ports. 
Jurisdiction, whether exercised by the flag, coastal or port state, is of 
different dimensions. It could involve the power to make decisions or 
rules, known as prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction. There is also the 
power to take executive action in pursuance of, or consequent on, the 
* Solicitor and Advocate of the Supreme Court of Nigeria; LL.B. (Hons.), University of 
Benin, 1992; LL.M., University of Alberta, 1998; SJ.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University. This 
work has benefited immensely from the insightful comments of both Professors Elaine Hughes and 
Professor Linda Reif of the University of Alberta and Professor Sompong Sucharitkul of Golden 
Gate University School of Law. The writer takes full responsibility, however, for any errors. 
I. John Hare, Port State Control: Strong Medicine to Cure a Sick Industry, 26 GA. J. INT'L & 
COMPo L. 571 (1997). 
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making of decisions or rules, referred to as enforcement or prerogative 
jurisdiction.2 A third category has been identified as adjudicative 
jurisdiction and involves the power of a court or administrative tribunal 
to hear a case against a vessel or a person,3 but it appears that this third 
class is encompassed in enforcement jurisdiction.4 
Although the traditional approaches have been of immense utility in 
addressing the complex problem of ship-source oil pollution, there is still 
room for improvement. This would necessitate consideration of an 
alternative approach to strengthen the existing scheme of things. One 
such alternative is an international norm of corporate behavior. Unlike 
the traditional approaches which are state-centric, focusing attention on 
states, this approach would shift the emphasis to corporations. The point 
being canvassed is that the issues of compliance and enforcement would 
take a back seat if oil and shipping companies, the primary players in 
international oil trade would conduct their businesses ethically and with 
due consideration for the interest of society, as opposed to the inordinate 
desire for profit maximization that defines their current attitude. 
To do justice to the important issues discussed here, this article will be 
divided into three major sections. The first section defines the terms 
"compliance" and "enforcement" as they are used in this work. The 
second section contains an exposition of the traditional methods of 
compliance and enforcement, including their bases, scope, strengths and 
pitfalls. This part is divided into three subsections, each concentrating on 
a single method. The third section discusses an alternative approach of a 
norm of corporate behavior, emphasizing that ethical principles should 
be given legal teeth in international business and be integrated into the 
corpus of international law. The conclusion reached is that a concerted 
and disinterested application of a combination of traditional approaches 
with the proposed alternative approach will go a long way toward 
improving compliance and enforcement of international regulations. 
2. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, 298 (4th ed. 1990). 
3. See D. Bodansky, Protecting the Marine Environment From Vessel-Source Pollution: 
UNCLOS III and Beyond, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 719, 731 (1991). 
4. See C. Wang, A Review of the Enforcement Regime for Vessel-Source Oil Pollution 
Control, 16 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 305 (1986), where he asserts that enforcement jurisdiction 
"grants a state the competence to adopt reasonable measures to compel, induce compliance, or to 
impose sanctions, for non-compliance with applicable laws, regulations, or enforceable judgments 
by means of administrative or executive action, or judicial proceedings." ld. at 309. See also 
BROWNLIE, supra note 2, and A.V. Lowe, The Enforcement of Marine Pollution Regulations, 12 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 624 (1975), where both writers settle for the prescriptive-enforcement 
dichotomy. 
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II. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT: 
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
Enhancing or improving compliance with international norms in every 
given area is a topic that currently preoccupies international legal 
scholars.5 Since many "environmental" treaties now exist,6 the issue of 
eliciting compliance is apparently more prominent in environmental 
matters: "There are few aspects of international law in which issues of 
compliance are more salient than in the case of international 
environmental obligations.,,7 
Compliance, in this context, can be defined as "an actor's behavior that 
conforms to a treaty's explicit rules."g It denotes a voluntary acceptance 
by a state of the provisions of an international instrument and a 
corresponding reflection of this acceptance in its conduct. Thus, a state 
can accept the equipment and discharge standards contained in 
MARPOL 73178,9 implement them in local legislation, and ensure that its 
ships abide by them. In view of that, compliance "should be seen as 
something that goes beyond "implementation," a term which tends to be 
used in a technical or procedural sense to mean that a state has taken the 
necessary steps to carry out its obligations under an international 
agreement.")O Implementation normally precedes compliance and is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for compliance. II . 
Enforcement, on the other hand, refers to measures jointly or unilaterally 
adopted by a competent authority to ensure respect for international 
commitments embodied in agreements if they are not honored 
5. Karin Mickelson, Carrots, Sticks or Stepping Stones: Differing Perspectives on 
Compliance with International Law, in TRILATERAL PERSPECfNES ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ISSUES: FROM THEORY INTO PRACfICE 35 (Thomas J. Schoenbaum, et al. eds., 1998) 
6. More than one thousand treaties have been concluded on this topic. See M. E. O'Connell, 
Enforcing the New International Law of the Environment, 35 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 293, 295-296 
(1992). 
7. Phillip M. Saunders, Development Cooperation and Compliance With International 
Environmental Law: Past Experience and Future Prospects, in TRILATERAL PERSPECfIVES ON 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES: FROM THEORY INTO PRACfICE 89 (Thomas 1. Schoenbaum, et al. 
eds., 1998). 
8. RONALD MITCHELL, INTENTIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
AND TREATY COMPLIANCE 30 (1994). 
9. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, I.M.e.O. Doc. 
MP/CONFIWP 35 (Nov. 2, 1973) reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1319, and the Protocol relating thereto, 
I.M.C.O. Doc. TSPP/CONFI1I, (Feb. 16, 1978) reprinted in 17 I.L.M 546. 
10. Mickelson, supra note 5, at 36. 
II. Id. 
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voluntarily in practice. 12 The distinction, therefore, is that enforcement 
has to do with "the act of compelling conformity with a particular norm 
or regime ... [and] carries with it the notion of outside intervention of 
one form or another, while "compliance" implies a decision on the part 
of an actor to conform to a rule of his or her own accord, according to 
whatever calculus he or she might employ.,,13 
Both concepts however, are related. One school of thought holds that the 
possibility of enforcement is a critical factor in the decision to comply. 
Articulating the views of this school, Gunther Handl asserts that "[t]he 
prospect of at least symbolic formal enforcement remains a defining 
characteristic of any legal regime .... ,,14 An opposite, but no less valid, 
view is that the connection between compliance and formal enforcement 
procedures is not that prominent. According to Abram Chayes and 
Antonia Handler Chayes, "inducing compliance with treaties is not a 
matter of 'enforcement' but a process of negotiation." 15 
An eclectic perspective embracing the two opposing views presents a 
clearer picture of the existence and resolution of the compliance-
enforcement problem. As Oran Young observes, "Enforcement is no 
doubt a sufficient condition for the achievement of compliance in many 
situations, but [there is] no reason to regard it as a necessary condition in 
most realms of human activity.,,16 International oil pollution control has 
involved a number of negotiations accommodating different interests 
with a view toward ensuring compliance. 17 There is no noticeable harm 
in exploring the option of some form of enforcement against states to 
ensure compliance. 18 At the moment, the approach adopted by 
international law is to expect flag states to comply with their 
12. Ibrahim Shihata, implementation, Enforcement, alld Compliance with international 
Environmental Agreements - Practical Suggestions in Light of the World Bank's Experience, 9 GEO. 
lNT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 37 (1996). 
13. Mickelson, supra note 5, at 36. 
14. Gunther Handl, Controlling implementation of and Compliance With international 
Environmental Agreements: The Rocky Roadfrom Rio,S COLO. 1. lNT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 305, 
330 (1994). 
15. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement: State 
Behavior Under Regulatory Treaties, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 311, 312 (1991). 
16. ORAN YOUNG, COMPLIANCE AND PuBLIC AUTHORITY: A THEORY WITH INTERNATIONAL 
ApPLICATIONS 25 (1979) 
17. Mitchell, supra note 8, at 115-117. 
18. The subject of enforcement against states and inducing state compliance is outside the 
scope of this article. On this, see Emeka Duruigbo, Environmental Aspects Of International Oil 
Trade: Business Ethics And Economic Cooperation as Compliance Tools In International Law 
(1998) (unpublished LL.M. thesis on file with the University of Alberta Library). The present article 
will concentrate on enforcement against ships or in the actual sense, the corporations that own these 
ships. 
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international obligations by enforcing international rules against their 
ships. There is also room for enforcement by coastal states and port 
states, especially where flag states fail in their duty. Describing the 
extant system, Wang states as follows: 
Because there is no global or regional organization, generally 
speaking, to enforce international rules and standards and/or 
national laws and regulations conforming to and giving effect to 
these international rules and standards . . . the existing 
enforcement scheme is one wherein measures are taken against a 
vessel of a state by all or some other states .... 19 
The next section is devoted to a discussion of the existing enforcement 
scheme. 
III. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
A. FLAG STATE JURISDICTION 
The principle is firmly established in international law that a ship on the 
high seas is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of its flag state.20 A 
corollary of the concept of the freedom of the high seas, the principle 
was enunciated in the Lotus Case by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice as follows: 
Vessels on the high seas are subject to no authority except that of 
the state whose flag they fly. In virtue of the principle of the 
freedom of the seas, that is to say the absence of any territorial 
sovereignty upon the high seas, no state may exercise any kind 
of jurisdiction over foreign vessels upon them?1 
19. Wang, supra note 4, at 308. 
20. Moritaka Hayashi, Enforcement by Non-Flag States on the High Seas Under the 1995 
Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVT'L. L. REV. 1 
(1996). 
21. Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.U. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 25. The law, 
however, recognizes exceptions to the general principle. See art. 92 (1) of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.621122 (Oct. 7,1982) reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 
1261 [hereinafter "LOSC"). They include cases such as piracy (LOSC, art. 105), unauthorized 
broadcasting (LOSC, art. 109), and the right of hot pursuit (LOSC, art. 111). 
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Since no state has authority over the high seas, this could give rise to a 
chaotic situation. Flag state jurisdiction therefore serves a need for the 
preservation of order on the high seas.22 
Freedom of the high seas, while not necessarily wrong, has had 
enormous implications for the oceans, the resources contained in them, 
and the marine environment in general, translating into a case of an: 
uninhibited liberty to transport oil and other goods over the 
common resource, the oceans, with each vessel being subject 
only to the jurisdiction of the flag state for all purposes on the 
high seas. Incidents of free navigation, such as pollution from 
ballasting and deballasting, [and] oil spills from collisions and 
stranding of ships, [become] a liability to be borne by the 
international community as a whole. 23 
The preference for the flag state in control of its ships is premised 
basically on "territoriality" or "nationality." The territoriality principle 
posits that a flag state is entitled to exercise its jurisdiction over its ships 
because a ship is an extension of the state's territory, a floating island?4 
The territoriality principle has received attention in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence25, although courts have had cause on a number of 
occasions to give cognizance to its perceived limitations.26 The principle 
received an international judicial imprimatur in the Lotus Case 27 where 
the court held that "what occurs on board a vessel on the high seas must 
be regarded as if it occurred on the territory of the State whose flag the 
ship flies." 
According to the nationality principle, states have jurisdiction over their 
nationals even in the case of extraterritorial acts because the national 
owes allegiance to his or her own country. Therefore, the flag state 
22. Bodansky, supra note 3, at 736. 
23. David Dzidzomu and B.M. Tsamenyi, Enhancing International Control of Vessel-Source 
Oil Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 1982: A Reassessment, 10 U. TASMANIA. L. 
REV. 269, 270 (1991). 
24. See United States V. Rogers, 150 U.S. 249 at 264 (1893). 
25. See, for instance, Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail, 120 U.S. I (1887); McCulloch v. 
Sociedad Nacional de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963). 
26. In Scharrenberg v. Dollar Steamship Co., 245 U.S. 122, 127 (1917) the court said: "It is, of 
course, true that for purposes of jurisdiction a ship, even on the high seas, is often said to be part of 
the territory of the nation whose flag it flies: But in the physical sense this expression is obviously 
figurative, and to expand the doctrine to the extent of treating seamen employed on such a ship as 
working in the country of its registry is quite impossible." Id. at 127. (footnote omitted.) See also 
Chenng Chi Cheung v. R. [1939] AC. 160 where Lord Atkin rejected the floating island theory. 
27. See infra note 21. 
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derives the legitimacy to exercise jurisdiction over its ships because they 
are its nationals.28 It should be noted, however, that "since the territorial 
and nationality principles and the incidence of dual nationality create 
parallel jurisdiction and possible double jeopardy, many states place 
limitations on the nationality principle.,,29 
1. Application of Flag State Jurisdiction 
The 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the 
Sea by Oi/3D, as amended, makes elaborate provisions favoring exclusive 
flag state prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. It provides that any 
discharge of oil prohibited by the Convention "shall be an offence 
punishable under the laws of the relevant territory in respect of the 
ship,',31 the relevant territory being the state in which a vessel is 
registered or whose nationality is possessed by an unregistered ship.32 
MARPOL 73/7833 follows in the footsteps of its predecessor and 
provides, among other things, that any party shall furnish to the flag state 
evidence, if any, that a ship has discharged harmful substances in 
violation of the provisions of the regulation.34 The flag state, in tum, 
shall investigate the matter and if satisfied that sufficient evidence is 
available, shall commence proceedings in accordance with its law as 
soon as possible.35 
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention36 ("LOSC") is also emphatic on 
flag state jurisdiction. It provides that unless in exceptional cases 
provided in international treaties or in LOSC itself, ships shall be subject 
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state on the high seas.37 
28. See S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) where the court accepted the nationality, 
rather than the territoriality, theory of flag state jurisdiction. 
29. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, at 303 (footnote omitted). 
30. 327 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OILPOL]. 
31. OILPOL, art. VI (I). 
32. Id. art. II (I). 
33. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, l.M.C.O. Doc. 
MP/CONFIWP 35 (Nov. 2,1973) reprinted in 121.L.M. 1319. 
34. Id. art. 6 (3). 
35. Id. art. 6 (4). 
36. LOSC, supra note 22. 
37. Id. art. 92. 
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2. Problems with Flag State Jurisdiction 
Flag state jurisdiction is not essentially wrong.38 The problem has had to 
do with flag states discharging their obligations in international law. Flag 
states appear reluctant to enforce standards against their ships.39 A study 
published in 1989 showed that of three hundred referrals by North Sea 
states, flag states had taken action on only 17 per cent.40 This attitude 
could be associated with the fact that it is in consonance with patriarchal 
protection for a flag state to be hesitant about punishing its nationals for 
offenses committed not primarily against it. In any case, some of these 
vessels are owned by multinational corporations who, in real terms, are 
more powerful than many flag states.41 Thus, the government of a flag 
state ignores their interests at its own peril. Also, since flag states often 
do not bear the consequences of some of the polluting activities of their 
vessels, they lack the incentive to act.42 
The inability to deal with matters regarding their ships, from a practical 
standpoint, could also affect a flag state's performance. A ship need not 
visit ports located in its flag state if such ports do not fall within its 
normal business route. In that circumstance, it becomes difficult for flag 
states to see some of these ships and inspect them to ensure compliance 
with construction and design standards by such vessels.43 The cost of 
equipping and operating a navy or coast guard large and competent 
enough to police its massive merchant fleet may also militate against a 
state's desire to enforce internationallaw.44 
Some flag states are also involved in "flags of convenience" shipping 
and this has been linked to the pitfalls of flag state jurisdiction. 
According to Professor Dempsey, "[t]he legal fiction of flags of 
38. Bodansky, supra note 3, at 737. "In discussions concerning flag state jurisdiction, the 
question has not been its pennissibility but rather its adequacy." 
39. A. V. Lowe, The Enforcement of Marine Pollution Regulations, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 624 
(1975). Lowe noted that: "Flag States are sometimes unable to institute proceedings against their 
vessels which may not visit their ports for many months, and some states appear unwilling to do so 
even when the opportunity arises." 
40. MARIE-JOSE STOOP, OLIEVERONTREINIGING DOOR SCHEPEN OP DER NOORDZEE OVER DE 
PERIODE 1982 - 1987: OPSPORING EN VERVOLGING (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Werkgroep 
Noordzee, July 1989); cited in MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 163. 
41. T. DoNALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 31 (1992). 
42. Bodansky, supra note 3, at 737. 
43. P.S. Dempsey, Compliance and Enforcement in International Law-Oil Pollution of the 
Marine Environment by Ocean Vessels, 6 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 459, 526 (1984). 
44. P. Dempsey and L. Helling, Oil Pollution by Ocean Vessels-Environmental Tragedy: The 
Legal Regime of Flags of Convenience, Multilateral Conventions, and Coastal States, 10 DENV. 1. 
INT'L L. & POL'y 37, 63 (1980). 
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convenience, as well as overriding economic considerations, inhibit the 
effectiveness of a regime of flag state enforcement over violations in the 
"commons" of the high seas.'.45 The following subsection will discuss 
this controversial subject. 
3. Nationality of Ships, Registration of Ships, and 
Flags of Convenience 
One of the fallouts of flag state jurisdiction is the sailing of ships under 
what has come to be known as flags of convenience.46 This issue will be 
discussed under three separate sections: nationality of ships, registration 
of ships, and flags of convenience practice. 
a. Nationality of Ships 
The notion is fundamental in international law that all ships must possess 
a nationality47, the rationale being that "[t]he registration of ships and the 
need to fly the flag of the country where the ship is registered are . . . 
essential for the maintenance of order on the open sea.,,48 A ship enjoys 
the nationality of the state whose flag it is entitled to fly.49 
In exercising the right of attributing its nationality to a ship, a state 
enjoys virtually unfettered powers. The only limitation is that the grant 
must be in consonance with internationally respected criteria, which 
nevertheless are few and easy to meet.50 In general there are only three 
criteria set by international law to determine the validity of the exercise 
of the right to grant nationality to a ship. First, such grants must not 
impinge upon the rights of other states. For example, a state may not 
impose its nationality upon vessels that already have, and desire to 
maintain, the nationality of another state. Second, a grant of nationality 
will be invalid if there is reasonable ground for suspicion that the ship 
45. Dempsey, supra note 43, at 557. 
46. George Kasoulides, The 1986 United Nations Convention on the Conditions for the 
Registration of Vessels and the Question of Open Registry, 20 OCEAN DEV. & lNT'L L. 543 (1989). 
47. David Matlin, Re-Evaluating the Status of Flags of Convenience Under International Law, 
23 VAND. J. 1'RANSNAT'LL. 1017,1021 (1991). 
48. MARJORIEM. WHITEMAN, 9 DIGESTOFlNT'LLAW 21 (1968). 
49. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 450 V.N.T.S. 82 art. 5 (1). LOSe, supra note 21, 
art. 91(1). See also, Rachel Roat, Promulgation and Enforcement of Minimum Standards for Foreign 
Flag Ships, 6 BROOKLYN J.lNT'L L. 54 (1980). 
50. Julie Mertus, The Nationality of Ships and International Responsibility: The Reflagging of 
the Kuwaiti Oil Tankers, 17 DENV. J.lNT'L L. & POL'y 207 (1988). 
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will be used in violation of international law. Finally, a state must choose 
a single nationality for its ships.51 
. A ship which does not meet, for instance, the criterion of sailing under 
the flag of one state only, exposes itself to some undesirable 
consequences. A ship possessing dual or multiple nationality is regarded 
as a ship without nationality, or a stateless vesse1.52 A stateless vessel 
enjoys no protection under national and international law.53 In United 
States V. Marino-Garcia, it was stated: "Vessels without nationality are 
international pariahs. They have no internationally recognised right to 
. f I h h' h ,,54 naVIgate ree y on t e Ig seas. 
Apart from the above stated restriction, every state has the right to grant 
its nationality to a merchant ship under conditions which it deems fit.55 
b. Registration of Ships 
The usual administrative mechanism through which vessel nationality is 
acquired is registration. Ship registration policies of states could be 
conveniently classified into three types: closed, open, and intermediate. 
For states operating the closed system, registration is generally closed to 
ships owned by non-nationals. Manning and crewing of such vessels are 
also dominated by their nationals. Other stringent conditions for 
registration also exist. The United States falls into this category, and is 
described as having "the most stringent registration requirements of any 
maritime nation. ,,56 
Open registries, on the other hand, operate an "open door policy" 
enabling natural and legal persons, regardless of their nationality, to 
register their ships with them and sail under their flags. Manning and 
crewing requirements are relaxed, and standards are flexible. 57 Vessels 
registered in these states are commonly referred to as "flags of 
convenience" ships.58 In a 1984 report, the United Nations Conference 
51. Id.at212. 
52. LOSC, supra note 21, art. 92 (2). 
53. Naim-Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine (1948) A.c. 351. But cf. LOSC, supra 
note 21, art. 93, regarding ships flying the flag of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. 
54. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382 (1985). 
55. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571,584 (1983). See also the Muscat Dhows Case (France v. 
Great Britain) Hague Ct. Rep. 93 (Scott) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1916). 
56. H. Edwin Anderson, m, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, 
Politics and Alternatives, 21 TuL. MAR. L.J. 139,151 (1996). 
57. The subject of Open Registries is discussed more fully in the next section. 
58. The terms "Open Registry" ("OR") and "Flags of Convenience" ("FOC") will be used 
interchangeably here. 
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on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") identified five countries as 
having major open registry fleets: the Bahamas, Bermuda, Cyprus, 
Liberia and Panama. 59 
The intermediate group is a halfway house combining some of the 
features of the other two systems. A salient example is the new 
Luxembourg registry under which registration is allowed if Luxembourg 
citizens, corporations or a "society anonyme" (public limited company) 
holds more than 50 percent of the ownership of the ships.60 Similar to 
the practice in closed registries, but quite unlike the general practice in 
open registries, a company must actually establish a business presence in 
Luxembourg to be registered.61 
Whichever policy it adopts, a state's right to admit ships to its refistry 
and under whatever conditions it chooses, remains unequivocal6 and 
other states are under an obligation to recognise the exercise of this right, 
even if unilaterally made.63 This right is seen as a corollary of the 
principle of state sovereignty.64 The problem is that it tends to elevate 
FOC states to sovereign positions depicted in Lord Ellenborough's 
rhetorical question: "Can the Island of Tobago pass a law to bind the 
rights of the whole world?,,65 
c. Flags of Convenience Practice 
1. Preliminary Matters 
Although open registries enjoy a rich history, it will not be necessary for 
the purposes of this article to undertake an excursion into the archives. 
Suffice it to say that the practice of using flags other than that of one's 
nationality has seen better days.66 
59. See Kasoulides, supra note 46, at 547. 
60. See Luc Frieden, The New Luxembourg Shipping Register, [1991] LMCLQ 257, 257-258. 
61. Id. at 258. 
62. LOSC, supra note 21, art. 91 (I). 
63. BOSLAWA A. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY 94, 
102-103 (1962). 
64. Id. at 104. 
65. L.F.E. Goldie, Environmental Catastrophes and Flags of Convenience - Does the Present 
Law Pose Special Liability Issues? 3 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 63,68-69 (1991). (footnote omitted). 
66. For an excellent historical account of the evolution of flags of convenience, see RODNEY 
CARLISLE, SOVERIEGNTY FOR SALE: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE PANAMANIAN AND 
LIBERIAN FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE (1981). 
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The expression "flags of convenience" is applied to a phenomenon which 
defies easy definition.67 Nevertheless, in his epic work on the subject, 
Flags of Convenience: An International Legal Study,68 Dr. Boslaw 
Boczek defines it as "the flag of any country allowing the registration of 
foreign owned and foreign controlled vessels under conditions which for 
whatever the reasons, are convenient and opportune for the persons who 
are registering the vessels.,,69 A strict interpretation of this definition 
would reveal some defects. In the 1980s, the United States registry was 
made available for Kuwaiti-owned and Kuwaiti-controlled vessels for 
reasons convenient and opportune for the persons involved, among 
which was the facilitation of commerce during the Iran - Iraq war.70 Yet, 
it would be totally objectionable to classify the United States as a flag of 
convenience ("FOC") state. 
A descriptive approach to the concept is preferable. The Rochdale 
Committee71 defined such flags by recourse to their salient characteristics 
including: ownership by non-nationals, easy access to the registry, taxes 
that are low and levied abroad, participation mainly by small powers to 
whom receipts from the business might make a difference to national 
income and balance of payments, manning of the ships by non-nationals, 
and lack of the power and administrative machinery to impose 
regulations or the inclination or capability to control the companies 
themselves. 
It is unlikely that a single case will contain all of the above criteria, and 
all the conditions need not apply for a state to be categorized as an open 
registry.72 Some states, such as Gibraltar and Netherland Antilles, offer 
tax incentives, yet ensure control over manning, safety and 
certification.73 
67. Ebere Osieke, Flags of Convenience Vessels: Recent Developments, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 
604 n.! (1979). 
68. BOCZEK, supra note 63. 
69. [d. 
70. See Margaret Wachenfeld, ReFlagging Kuwaiti Tankers: A U.S. Response in the Persian 
Gulf, 1988 DUKE LJ. 174. It should be noted that an attack on a ship flying the United States flag is 
deemed an attack on the United States, an act of aggression which the country is entitled to defend, 
pre-empt or respond to. 
71. Committee of Inquiry into Shipping, Report 51 (London: H.M.S.O., 1970) Cmnd 4337. 
72. Kasoulides, supra note 46, at 545. 
73. [d. 
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11. Reasons for the Open Registry Practice 
The past forty years have witnessed a tremendous proliferation of 
merchant shipping fleets flying flags of convenience.74 The reason for 
this is clearly connected with the perceived benefits of sailing under such 
flags. The primary reason why multinational corporations involved with 
shipping and oil interests adopt FOC is the maximization of profit.75 
Edward Stettinus, a former United States Secretary of State, along with a 
group of leading American entrepreneurs and multinational corporations, 
masterminded the creation of the Liberian registry with the object of 
increasing profits.76 This is achieved through the benefits which the open 
registry ("OR") practice offers.77 
One such benefit is easy access to registration. Non-nationals of OR 
states have the opportunity to register their ships under extremely liberal 
laws78 and without necessarily going to the state. For instance, the 
Liberian registry is administered through International Registries Inc., 
which is headquartered in New York.79 
Generous tax terms offered by ORs present yet another attraction to ship 
owners. Generally open registries impose no taxes for income earned 
from operating vessels under their flag while engaged in international 
trade.so They hardly charge any fees beyond a registry fee and an annual 
fee based on tonnage. A guarantee or acceptable understanding 
concerning freedom from future taxation may also be given.81 
74. R.T. Epstein, Should the Fair Labor Standards Act Enjoy Extraterritorial Application?: A 
Look at the Unique Case 0/ Flags o/Convenience. 13 V. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 653 (1993). 
75. Richard Payne, Flags of Convenience and Oil Pollution: A Threat to National Security, 3 
HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 67, 69 (1980). 
76. Anderson, supra note 56, at 159-160. 
77. Registration in a foreign registry or reflagging for a perceived benefit(s) is not new. V.S. 
and Latin American ships involved in the obnoxious slave trade during the 1800s flew the flags of 
states that were not signatories to a slavery suppression treaty authorizing Britain to board and arrest 
ships registered with signatory states. See CARLISLE, supra note 66, at xiii. Also in the 19th century, 
British fishennen registered vessels in Norway with a view toward avoiding fishing restrictions. See 
Monensen v. Peters (1906) 43 SCOT. L.R. 872. 
78. Edith Wittig, Tanker Fleets and Flags of Convenience: Advantages. Problems. and 
Dangers, 14 TEx. INT'L L.1. 115, 121 (1979). 
79. Anderson, supra note 56, at 155. 
80. See Vincent Hubbard, Registation of Vessels Under Vanuatu Law, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 
235. (1982). 'The Republic of Vanuatu levies no income taxes of any kind on either business or 
personal income .... " [d. at 241. 
81. See Rochdale Committee, supra note 71. 
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Open registries are also favored because they assure a better return on 
investment by minimizing operating costS.82 By registering their ships in 
such registries, shipowners are not saddled with the requirements of 
employing highly qualified personnel for manning and crewing purposes, 
thus reducing their salary budgets. The absence of social security 
requirements and strong unions, constantly agitating for worker rights 
and improvement in working conditions, are also some of the "blessings" 
of an open registry.83 According to Exxon Oil Corporation, a tanker with 
a 28-man crew costing US $560,000 to run if registered in the 
Philippines would cost US $2.5million to run if registered in the United 
States.84 
The high standards in closed registries present high hurdles which some 
ship owners find impossible to surmount. Open registries therefore 
provide a lifeline for the businesses of those ships that might not meet 
some international standards. One writer sees this development as an 
inevitable consequence of tanker economics because as ships age they 
tend to fall into the hands of less scrupulous owners who want to earn a 
precarious living.85 
Further, ship owners have been attracted to these registries by operating 
on the joint assumptions that the existence of anti-pollution conventions 
ties the hands of the maritime nations that honor them and that the 
structure of open registries permits owners of FOC vessels to be 
loosened from the restrictions of such a regulatory system.86 
Some of the above reasons may have been overemphasized as 
determinants of the decision to patronise an OR. Ship owners would 
probably insist on FOC shipping in the absence of ~ome of these factors 
or even if some corresponding benefit were offered by non-FOC states.87 
According to McConnell, many OR fleets are composed of modern, 
well-maintained vessels and many of the OR states have commenced 
enforcing safety standards and inspections in compliance with 
82. Kasoulides, supra note 46, at 565. 
83. Payne, supra note 75, at 71. 
84. Heneghan, Shipping Guidelines, Reuters North European Service (April 12, 1982), cited in 
Goldie, supra note 65, at 73 n.471. 
85. Goldie, supra note 65, at 89. 
86. Goldie, supra note 65, at 90, where he noted that: "In such a context, of course, a flag-of-
convenience state can become a party to violation of an anti-pollution convention. It is merely 
anticipated to fail, conspicuously and consistently, if not conscientiously, in performing its treaty 
obligation to police effectively the contaminating proclivities of ships privileged to fly its flag." 
87. See UNCTAD, Action on the Question a/Open Registries, at II, U.N. Doc. TDIBIC.41220. 
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international conventions.88 Ship owners' preference for open registries 
is more likely traceable to the freedom from control which FOC states 
provide.89 Modern business philosophy favors less state intervention and 
control over business activities, as illustrated by the growing significance 
of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and the current campaign for 
introduction of a multilateral agreement on investment ("MAI"),9o which 
(seek to) reduce the influence of individual states over business activities 
taking place in their territories. 
Nevertheless, the underlying reasons behind the genesis and sustenance 
of FOC shipping can be located in at least two areas. One is the 
economic position of the states involved in the practice. A characteristic 
shared by most of them is that they belong to that section of the world 
community marked by a lack of political power and economic clOUt.91 
For them, therefore, the practice exists as a means of keeping their 
sagging economies alive. 
Further, the growing importance of petroleum as an energy resource and 
a tool for industrialization has contributed in no small measure to the 
fuelling of this practice. Since much of the oil needed in the 
industrialized world is produced elsewhere, open registries will subsist to 
"supply" vessels for oil transportation. It therefore follows that oil 
producing and consuming countries building their economies through 
commerce in oil share in the blame for the genesis and continuance of 
this practice.92 
111. Flags of Convenience and Environmental Issues 
In some quarters, vessels sailing under flags of convenience have 
become nearly synonymous with environmental hazards. While the battle 
88. Moira McConnell, " ... Darkening Confusion Mounted Upon Darkening Confusion": The 
Search for the Elusive Genuine Link 16 J. MAR. L. & COM. 365,368 (1985). Cf Ademuni-Odeke, 
Port State Control and U.K. Law, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 657 (1997) maintaining that FOC states are 
recalcitrant or ineffective in enforcing anti-pollution standards. 
89. McConnell,ld. at 368. 
90. See Peter C. Newman, MAl: A Time Bomb With a Very Short Fuse," MACLEAN'S, March 
2, 1998, (Magazine), at 51. "We want corporations to be able to make investments overseas without 
being required to take local partners, to export a given percentage of their output, to use local parts, 
or to meet a dozen other restrictions." - quoting Carla Hills, a U.S. Trade Representative. 
91. See Kasoulides, supra note 46, at 547 for a list of open registry states from 1930 to 1986. 
92. This argument can be extended to incorporate the point that maritime oil pollution itself is 
a direct consequence of petroleum's prominence as the economic basis of the industrialized world. 
See Anderson, supra note 56, at 163; Bill Shaw, Brenda Winslett, & Frank Cross, A Proposal to 
Eliminate Marine Oil Pollution, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 157 (1987). 
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against open registries was earlier fought by organized labor,93 more 
recently "[ e ]nvironmental and conservation groups, which, in the context 
of domestic industrial activities, have not been known to have interests 
sympathetic with those of the maritime trade unions are the new 
opponents.,,94 
Open registries do not sign on to marine safety and environmental 
treaties and have also been said to be apathetic toward enforcement of 
international law95 , By so doing, weaken the effectiveness of 
international regulatory efforts. It becomes a seemingly unwise business 
practice for a ship owner to allow him- or herself to be placed at a 
competitive disadvantage by a colleague who does not bear the cost of 
complying with international standards. Avoiding the standards wherever 
the opportunity arises becomes almost inevitable, fostering in maritime 
environmental matters, a "Gresham's Law" scenario where, as in 
precious metal currencies, bad practices tend to drive out good ones 
when external restraints are non-existent or ineffective.96 
The ineffectiveness of OR states in ensuring compliance stems 
principally from their foundation. They are founded on the philosophy of 
improving their economic base through the attraction of shipping 
business by lowering standards. Rigid enforcement of international law 
will uproot the practice from the base and rob them of attendant benefits. 
As ,UNCTAD rightly observed, the enforcement of standards and the 
operation of a registry with the sole aim of making a profit are 
incompatible.97 Moreover, OR states generally lack the resources to 
enforce anti-pollution provisions against their vessels.98 
Apparently exasperated and disgusted with FOC shipping and the 
accompanying environmental problems, some scholars have concluded: 
93. See Goldie, supra note 65, at 63-66. 
94. [d. at 67. 
95. See Ademuni-Odeke, supra note 88. It has also been noted that "the modern practice of 
using flags of convenience has seriously undercut enforcement. Flags of convenience offer ship 
owners considerable financial benefit, in addition to avenues of avoiding otherwise stringent 
standards on safety, wages, training, and ship conditions." See Elissa Steglich, Note, Hiding in the 
Hulls: Attacking the Practice of High Seas Murder of Stowaways Through Expanded Criminal 
Jurisdiction, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1323, 1336 (2000). 
96. L.F.E. Goldie, Recognition and Dual Nationality - A Problem of Flags of Convenience, 39 
BRIT. Y.B.INT'LL. 220, 221 n1 (1963). 
97. UNCTAD, supra note 87. 
98. The Channel: Playing Canute With Pollution, ECONOMIST, April 10, 1971, at 77. 
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There is but one solution to the problem of oil spills, and that is 
the abolition of flag of convenience registry. The termination of 
flags of convenience would put an end to the causes of most oil 
spills - poorly trained crews and shoddy ship construction. 
Elimination of the less stringent safety standards under flags of 
convenience would greatly enhance a tanker's ability to make a 
voyage without running aground, colliding with objects or other 
ships, or losing oil because of structural failure.99 
117 
The above point is forceful, but still faces formidable opposition. While 
it is undisputed that many of the tanker accidents in the past have 
involved FOC vessels including the Torrey Canyon(1968), Argo 
Merchant (1976), and Amoco Cadiz (1978), it is also on record that the 
most extensive oil spill so far in terms of destruction and costs was that 
caused by the MV Exxon Valdez, a ship registered in the United States, 
which grounded off the coast of Alaska in 1989.100 
It must be conceded, however, that while oil spills are not the "exclusive 
preserve" of FOC vessels, the probability of spills being caused by them 
is higher since operational error is a prominent cause of maritime 
accidents and unqualified crews (for which FOC ships are noted), are 
more likely to commit such errors. 101 
Furthermore, oil spills account for only a small proportion of the total oil 
discharged at sea. The bulk comes from operational discharges,102 and 
every ship is involved in that, legally or otherwise, or is susceptible to it, 
regardless of place of registry. 
The above argument should not be taken too far, however, since it is 
more consistent with the character of a shipowner who, because of the 
lure of profit maximization, is involved in FOC shipping, to consider 
reducing operational expenses by indulging in illegal discharges. The 
anonymity of open registries also offers an incentive to take such risks 
and escape punishment. 103 
99. Shaw et aI., supra note 92, at 185. 
100. See Matlin, supra note 47, at 1052. 
101. According to lMO estimates, 90% of all marine pollution accidents are due to human error. 
See Bodansky, supra note 3, at 730 n.42. See also Anderson, supra note 56, at 163; New Ship Safety 
Code Targets Human Element in an Effort to Prevent Maritime Accidellfs, 33 PETROLEUM GAZETIE 
20,21 (1998). 
102. D.W. ABECASSIS AND R.L. JARASHOW, OIL POLLUTION FROM SHIPS 7 (2d ed. 1985). 
103. UNCTAD, supra note 87. 
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IV. Control of Open Registries 
In view of the pitfalls of FOC shipping, various measures have been 
taken to deal with this practice. These include the imposition of a 
"genuine link,,,I04confrontation from organized labor,105 and increasing 
port state control under international arrangements. 106 This article will 
not address the labor approach, which in the author's opinion was not 
environmentally motivated, but was concerned with workers' welfare. 
The concept of "genuine link" and increasing port state control are 
discussed below. 
The notion of "genuine link" was made applicable to ships for the fIrst 
time by Article 5 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, although it 
had been used earlier in a case involving the nationality of persons.107 
The article provides as follows: 
Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of nationality to 
ships for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right 
to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag 
they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between 
the State and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively 
exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical 
and social matters over ships flying its flag. 108 
The concept of genuine link concept as applied to ships has been 
severely criticized.109 However, efforts to rationalize or criticize this 
application are a dissipation of energy, since without a clear defInition in 
an international instrument, it is an ineffective tool for controlling FOC 
shipping. Any state can manipulate its open-ended nature and claim to be 
abiding by it. Thus, the concept required defInition. In 1986, it was 
proclaimed: "For the first time an international instrument now exists 
which defines the elements of the 'genuine link' that should exist 
104. See McConnell, supra note 88, at 366. 
lOS. See Notes, The Effect of United States Labour Legislation on the Flag of Convenience 
Fleet: Regulation of Shipboard Labor Relations and Remedies against Shoreside Picketing, 69 YALE 
L.1. 498, 502 (1960). 
106. Anderson, supra note 56, at 167. Port state control will be discussed in section C below. 
107. Nottebohm Case (Leichtenstein v. Guatamela), 1955I.C.J. Rep. 4. 
108. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 49, art 5 (1). This is substantially 
replicated in LOSC, supra note 21, arts. 91 and 94. 
109. See, e.g., Matlin, supra note 47, at 1033-1034. From the rich corpus of commentary on the 
subject. See also H.F. van Panhuys, "The Genuine Link Doctrine" and Flags of Convenience, 62 
AM. 1. INT'L L. 942 (1968); Myres McDougal and William Burke, A Footnote, 62 AM. 1. INT'L L. 
943 (1968); Simon Tache, The Nationality of Ships: The Definitional Controversy and Enforcement 
of the Genuine Link, 16INT'L L. 301 (1982); Moira McConnell, supra note 88. 
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between a ship and the state whose flag it flies."IIO This was in reference 
to the 1986 United Nations Convention on the Conditions for the 
Registration of Ships, III ("UNCCORS") also described as introducing 
"new standards of responsibility and accountability for the world 
shipping industry."ll2 
The principal provisions of UNCCORS relating to genuine link are 
contained in articles 8, 9 and 10. Article 8 requires a flag state to make 
provisions in its laws regarding the ownership of ships flying its flag. ll3 
Such laws must include appropriate provisions for participation by the 
flag state or its nationals in the ownership of ships flying its flag and 
"should be sufficient to permit the flag state to exercise effectively its 
jurisdiction and control over [those] ships .... ,,114 Although a state can 
establish its genuine link through ownership, as indicated above, it can 
also do so through manning. I 15 A flag state, therefore, is required to 
observe the principle that a satisfactory part of the complement 
consisting of officers and crew of ships flying its flag be nationals or 
persons domiciled or lawfully in permanent residence in the state. 116 
The problem with the above option on the establishment of genuine link 
is that it suggests that a flag state that chooses to establish its genuine 
link by recourse to the manning option would still be unable to exercise 
effective jurisdiction and control since in real terms, such control is 
dependent on ownership.ll7 
The role of the flag state in respect to management of ship owning 
companies and ships is covered in article 10. The flag state has a duty to 
ensure that ship owners seeking entry into its register are established or 
have a principal place of business in its territory. I IS In the alternative, the 
shipowner is required to appoint a representative or management person 
who is a national of the flag state or is domiciled in that state.119 The flag 
110. UNCTAD Information Unit, Press Release, U.N. Doc. TADIINF/I770 (7 February 1986). 
Ill. United Nations Convention on !be Conditions for !be Registration of Ships, reprinted in 26 
I.L.M. 1229 (1987) [hereinafter UNCCORSj. 
112. UNCTAD Information Unit, supra note 110. 
113. UNCCORS, supra note Ill, art 8 (I). 
ll4. [d. art. 8 (2). 
llS. [d. art. 7. 
ll6. [d. art. 9 (1). 
ll7. S.G. Sturrney, The United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, 
1987 LMCLQ 97, 101. A measure of control is exercisable over crew members by an issuing 
authority upon application for or renewal of licenses to operate or man a ship or seagoing vessel. 
ll8. UNCCORS, supra note Ill, art. 10 (I). 
ll9. [d. art. 10 (2). The representative could be a natural person or juridical person such as a 
corporation. 
19
Duruigbo: Compliance with Int'l Regulations
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
120 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 7:1 
state is also directed to ensure that persons accountable for the 
management and operation of a ship flying its flag are in a position to 
meet the financial obligations that may arise from the operation of such a 
ship. 120 
The above provision is weakened by the use of hortatory language. 
Sturmey derides this and opines that the only valid arguments against 
open registries are the lack of protection to seafarers employed in their 
ships and the fact that owners can escape their liabilities for pollution 
damage. Therefore, "[i]f the Convention has only recommendatory force 
in these regards, then perhaps it really was a case of "much ado about 
nothing" as so many commentators have observed.,,121 
It would seem that UNCCORS virtually left the problem unsolved. "It is 
obvious that the 1986 UNCCORS reaffirmed the flag state's supremacy 
and institutionalized the status quo, leaving the concept of "genuine link" 
still nebulous and controversial.,,122 In general, "it [failed] to achieve its 
stated objective. It appears to have come no closer to truly identifying an 
enforceable "genuine link" and, rather than phasing out open registry 
practice, its provisions appear to have legitimized the practice .... " 123 It 
may be worthwhile to note, however, that while UNCCORS did not go 
far enough, it surely was an improvement on the existing scheme.124 The 
fact that it has not been ratified by some traditional maritime and FOC 
states who accepted previous Conventions' position on genuine link 125 
suggests, at least, their recognition that UNCCORS makes inroads into 
their sphere of authority, a legal authority they are not yet ready to 
surrender. 
120. [d. art. 10 (3). This covers insurance, maritime lien and worker-interest protection 
measures. 
121. Sturmey, supra note 117, at 106. 
122. GEORGE KASOULIDES, PORT STATE CONTROL AND JURISDICTION 75 (1993). 
123. Moira McConnell, "Business as Usual": An Evaluation of the 1986 United Nations 
Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, 18 J. MAR. L. & COM. 435, 449 (1987). 
(footnote omitted). 
124. See George Kasoulides, The 1986 United Nations Convention on the Conditions for the 
Registration of Vessels and the Question of Open Registry, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 543, 566 
(1989), asserting that the requirements of the Convention are more onerous than existing national 
practices. 
125. Treaty status information provided by IUCN and last updated as of March I, 1997 shows 
that no major maritime power or FOC state is a party to UNCCORS. The treaty has not entered into 
force as a result, being unable to garner the necessary support in terms of tonnage. The parties at 
present include Algeria, Bolivia, Cameroon, CoteD'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Iraq, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Oman, Poland, Russian Federation, and Senegal. See 
<http://sedac.ciesin.org/prod/charlotte>. 
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d. Observations 
Marine environmental degradation and endangerment of the safety of life 
at sea are matters which are always condemned. Operation of a registry 
that facilitates these evils is thus abhorrent. In that connection, any 
measure aimed at eradicating FOC shipping could easily be embraced. In 
the considered opinion of this author, however, whatever is done in this 
regard, and considering the circumstances that surround open registries, 
the problem could best be solved by an approach that does not ignore the 
economics and equities of the situation. 
A pertinent question may be whether some FOC states can lay legitimate 
claim to equity since they might not come with clean hands. Yet the fact 
remains that most OR states are poor countries involved in the practice 
mainly to make ends meet. Where are the fairness and fraternal bond in 
an international community interested in extinguishing some countries' 
source of sustenance without assisting in fashioning alternative economic 
bases for them? Where is the equity in targeting OR states without 
requiring oil producing and consuming nations to be accountable for 
their actions, since their inordinate desire for economic development at 
the expense of environmental well-being has substantially led to the 
creation and sustenance of open registries? Where is the justice in 
allowing oil and shipping companies to go scot-free, and be free to 
continue promoting sharp business practices regardless of environmental 
implications, rather than implementing a system that makes them legally 
and socially responsible, and accountable to humanity and the 
environment? 
After all, if justice is done in this area, it will go a long way toward 
repairing past damage, safeguarding the present, and securing the future 
of the marine environment for the benefit of the present generation and 
generations yet unborn. 
B. COASTAL STATE JURISDICTION 
The approach of international law toward coastal state jurisdiction, 
another type of jurisdiction mentioned earlier, is to define it in terms of 
21
Duruigbo: Compliance with Int'l Regulations
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
122 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INTL & COMPo LAW [Vol. 7:1 
distinct zones of the oceans namely, internal waters,126 the territorial 
sea,127 the contiguous zonel28, and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).129 
Coastal states have plenary prescriptive and enforcement powers in their 
internal waters, subject only to restrictions accepted by treaty.130 Under 
MARPOL 73178, a coastal state may inspect a vessel in its internal 
waters or ports to ensure compliance with international standards on 
vessel construction and design,13I or to ascertain any violation of 
. . al d' h d d 132 mternauon ISC arge stan ar S. 
The coastal state is empowered to regulate pollution in its territorial sea. 
LOSC specifies matters on which the coastal state may legislate, 
including the safety of navigation, the preservation of the coastal state's 
environment, and the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution. 133 A 
coastal state is free to adopt its own pollution discharge rules for foreign 
vessels in the territorial sea, as there is no requirement for conformity of 
h 1 . h' . 11 134 t ese ru es WIt mtematIona aw. 
The above prescriptive jurisdiction is, however, limited by the obligation 
not to hamper, deny, or impair the right of innocent passage. 135 Passage 
is not innocent, however, when a vessel engages in an act of wilful and 
serious pollution. 136 The fact that the pollution must be "wilful and 
serious" before the right of innocent passage is extinguished may likely 
exclude most typical operational discharges of oil since they are rarely 
"serious," although they may be "wilful.,,137 The second limitation is the 
126. These are waters landward of the coastal state's baseline and include bays, river mouths, 
estuaries and ports. See LOSe, supra note 21, art. 8. 
127. This is the band of water seaward of the coastal state's baseline, over which it is sovereign. 
LOSe, supra note 21, art. 2. LOSe establishes a maximum breadth of 12 miles for the territorial sea. 
See Id. art. 3. 
128. This is a narrow band of water seaward of a state's territorial sea in which the state has 
limited jurisdiction to protect its territorial sea. LOSe, supra note 21, art. 33. It comprises a breadth 
of 24 miles measured from the baselines of the territorial sea. [d. 
129. This is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea extending up to 200 nautical miles 
from the baseline of the territorial sea. LOSe, supra note 21, arts. 55 and 57. In essence, if a state 
has a 12-mile territorial sea, the EEZ would not be more than 188 miles in breadth since its 200 -
mile maximum breadth is measured from the same baseline as the territorial sea. See DAVID 
A IT ARD, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 44 (1987). 
130. Bodansky, supra note 3, at 745. 
131. MARPOL 73n8, supra note 9, art. 5. 
132. MARPOL 73n8, supra note 9, art. 6. 
133. LOSe, supra note 21, arts. 21 and 211 (4). 
134. See LOSe, supra note 21, art 211(4). 
135. LOSe, supra note 21, arts 24 and 211(4). 
136. LOSe, supra note 21, art. 19 (2) (h). 
137. A.E. Boyle, Marine Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 79 AM. J. !NT'L L. 
347,359 (1985). 
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exclusion of coastal state regulation of the construction, design, 
equipment, and manning ("CDEM") standards in connection with 
foreign ships unless such rules give effect to generally accepted 
international rules and standards. '38 
Concerning the contiguous zone, the coastal state is permitted to 
"exercise the control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, 
fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial 
sea.,,139 It is doubtful that this encompasses measures to prevent or 
control pollution. 140 
With regard to enforcement, coastal states are empowered to investigate, 
arrest, and prosecute vessels in the territorial sea for contravention of 
pollution laws. '41 Coastal states also have limited jurisdiction to enforce 
EEZ pollution standards. '42 They can only do so when a vessel has 
committed a discharge violation of such a nature that results in or 
threatens major damage to the coastal state. 143 Otherwise, a coastal state 
can only require information about the identity of the ship and its next 
port of call and relay the information to the vessel's flag state or next 
port of call, so that either of these states can take appropriate action. A 
coastal state can act also in the event of maritime casualties with actual 
or potential harmful consequences. 144 
The coastal state's powers are further restricted by the requirement that it 
release vessels on bondl45 which generally limits available sanctions to 
monetary penalties. '46 The foregoing indicates very clearly that coastal 
state jurisdiction as a mechanism for ensuring compliance with 
international law is not structured to be a major tool. The preference of 
the international community has been the concentration of powers in the 
flag state or a division of powers between the flag and port states. The 
138. Lose, supra note 21, art. 21 (2). 
139. LOSe, supra note 21, art. 33. 
140. See Yoram Dinstein, Oil Pollution by Ships and Freedom of the High Seas, 3 J. MAR. L. & 
COM. 363 (1972). "[Wlith some stretch of the imagination, [oil pollution] may be considered as 
falling within the ambit of the sanitary clause." [d. at 367. Footnote omitted. See LOSe, supra note 
21, arts. 219 & 220 (1) & (3). 
14\. LOSe, supra note 21, art. 220 (2). 
142. LOSe, supra note 21, art. 220 (3). 
143. LOSe, supra note 21, art. 220 (5) and (6). 
144. LOSe, supra note 21, art. 221. 
145. LOSe, supra note 21, art. 226 (1) (b). 
146. LOSe, supra note 21, art. 230 (1). 
23
Duruigbo: Compliance with Int'l Regulations
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
124 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 7:1 
rationale is that enhanced coastal state powers would pose a threat to 
navigation. 147 
C. PORT STATE JURISDICTION 
As the name implies, port state jurisdiction is jurisdiction and control 
over ships by a port state. 148 It is jurisdiction based solely on a ship's 
presence in port. 149 Otherwise, a port state whose coastal waters have 
been affected by a ship's polluting activities can exercise jurisdiction as a 
coastal state. The basis of the policy entrenching port state jurisdiction 
has been well articulated by Professor Bodansky as follows: 
From a policy standpoint, port state enforcement represents a 
compromise between coastal and flag state enforcement. On the 
one hand, port states may be more inclined than flag states to 
enforce environmental norms, since port states are themselves 
coastal states and, as such, are at risk from substandard and 
delinquent vessels. Port state jurisdiction therefore serves as a 
useful corrective to inadequate flag state enforcement. On the 
other hand, port state enforcement is preferable to coastal state 
enforcement since it interferes much less with freedom of 
navigation and can generally be performed more safely. 
Stopping and boarding a vessel in transit at sea for inspection 
purposes directly interferes with the vessel's movement and can 
be hazardous, depending on the weather and location. In 
contrast, inspecting a vessel while in port imposes little if any 
burden on navigation and can be performed safely. ISO . 
This form of jurisdiction will be examined from the international and 
regional perspectives. 
1. International Legal Provisions on Port State Jurisdiction 
The Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 vested port states, for the first 
time, with authority over pollution incidents occurring on the high seas 
147. Boyle, supra note 137, at 364. 
148. A port state is a "state in the territorial waters of which a vessel is at any particular time, 
provided that the vessel is destined to or has just left a port in that state." See Sir Anthony Clarke, 
Pon State Control or Sub-Standard Ships: Who is to Blame? What is the Cure? 1994 LMCLQ 202. 
149. Bodansky, supra note 3, at 738. 
150. Bodansky, supra note 3, at 739. Moreover, the port state also provides facilities for 
investigation and collection of evidence. Boyle, supra note 137, at 364. 
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or in another state's coastal waters. 151 The port state may conduct 
inspections and institute proceedings against vessels that have violated 
"applicable international rules and standards.,,152 It may also conduct 
inspections for discharge violations in another state's coastal waters, and 
may prosecute for such discharges, however, subject to flag state pre-
emption for pollution offenses occurring on the high seas. 153 
Controversy rages as to the scope of jurisdictional competence conferred 
on port states by LOSC. Sally A. Meese l54 construes a port state's 
powers to enforce international discharge standards against any vessel in 
a way that presupposes that LOSe gives port states prescriptive authority 
to extend the application of international discharge standards to vessels 
on the high seas. 155 McDorman adopts a similar line of reasoning, 
maintaining that port states have prescriptive jurisdiction on the high 
seas. 156 
Bodansky seriously questions this reasoning, arguing that article 218 is 
in section 6 of Part XII, which is devoted to enforcement jurisdiction, 
rather than in section 5, which deals with prescriptive jurisdiction. 157 This 
scholar is of the view that when a port state exercises its enforcement 
powers by, for instance, inspecting a vessel to determine whether the 
vessel has committed a discharge violation on the high seas, "the port 
state is investigating a violation of another state's law, not its own, which 
it lacks jurisdiction to prescribe.,,158 Support for this view can be found in 
Cheng-Pang Wang's assertion, with respect to article 218, that "[t]he port 
state has been thereby recognized as having the competence to apprehend 
a foreign ship, which is voluntarily within the port ... of that state, for a 
discharge of oil pollution as defined by another State.,,159 
This latter view that a port state's powers for high seas offenses is 
limited to enforcement, certainly has merit. However, it also brings to the 
fore the difficulties that would arise if the position of port states is so 
limited. For instance, if a ship that has been apprehended by the port 
151. LOSC, supra note 21, art. 218. 
152. LOSC, supra note 21, art. 218 (I). 
153. LOSC, supra note 21, art. 228. 
154. Sally A. Meese, When Jurisdictional Interests Collide: International, Domestic and State 
Efforts to Prevent Vessel Source Oil Pollution, 12 OCEAN DEV. & lNT'L L. 71,92 (1982). 
155. Bodansky, supra note 3, at 762. 
156. Ted McDorman, Port State Enforcemellt: A Comment on Article 218 of the 1982 Law of 
the Sea Convention, 28 J. MAR1T. L. & COMM. 305,315 (1997). 
157. Bodansky, supra note 3, at 762. 
158. Bodansky, supra note 3, at 740. 
159. Wang, supra note 4, at 309. 
25
Duruigbo: Compliance with Int'l Regulations
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
126 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 7:1 
state for high seas discharge violations is from a flag state that either is 
not a signatory to the relevant international conventions or has not 
implemented the "applicable international standards" in local legislation, 
the port state will be unable to proceed against that ship. 
Other international measures on port state control also exist, an example 
of which is the consolidated port state control measures of the 
International Maritime Organization ("IMO,,).l60 The consolidated 
resolution and its annexures outline and stipulate the procedures for port 
state control. Inspections fall into two broad categories: initial port state 
inspections and more detailed inspections. There are also guidelines for 
detention and reporting procedures. 
2. Regional Port State Control Efforts 
Regional efforts relating to port state control are in place in different 
parts of the world, with the West and Central African Region adopting 
them most recently. Until the latter part of 1999, regional measures on 
port state control did not exist in West Africa, notwithstanding the 
lengthy existence of a legal framework for such a cooperative venture. 161 
The Abidjan Convention, drafted under the auspices of the United 
Nations Environment Programme's Regional Seas Programme, makes 
provisions which enjoin covered countries from embarking on individual 
or joint measures, in accordance with the Convention and its protocols, 
to "prevent, reduce, combat and control pollution of the Convention area, 
and to ensure sound environmental management of natural resources 
[using] the best practicable means at their disposal, and in accordance 
with their capabilities.,,162 
These countries must also cooperate with international, regional, and 
subregional organizations to adopt standards and practices that would 
enable them to accomplish these goalS.163 Parties' responsibilities to 
160. Resolution A787 (19): Procedures for Port State Control; adopted Nov. 23 1995. Full text 
of this document is reproduced on the University of Cape Town Marine and Shipping Law website, 
<http://www.uct.ac.zaJdepts!shiplaw!portstate.htm>. 
161. That is, the 1981 Convention for Co-Operation in the Protection and Development of the 
Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/IG.22n (March 31, 1981) reprinted in 20 l.L.M. 746 [hereinater, Abidjan Convention]. A 
few years ago, one African scholar wrote that the Abidjan Convention had "yet to elicit even a basic 
level of political commitment in the form of majority ratification or accession, the equipping of 
national institutions to carry out its requirements, or financial support for its implementation." See 
David Dzidzornu, Marine Pollution Control ill the West and Central African Regioll, 20 QUEEN'S 
LJ. 439, 477 (1995). 
162. Abidjan Convention, /d. art. 4 (I). See also art. 4 (3). 
163. Id. art. 4 (4). 
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work toward preventing, reducing, combating, and controlling pollution 
arising from incidents related to shipping are also underscored. 164 
A number of factors, mainly political and economic, accounted for the 
slow pace of translating these provisions into reality in West Africa. For 
the past ten years, that region has had various forms of commotion and 
civil disturbance, including guerrilla warfare in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
and Guinea-Bissau.165 In such an atmosphere, it is wishful thinking to 
expect much to be accomplished. 
Financial constraints also impede cooperative efforts. A study conducted 
by the United Nations Environment Programme on a West African sub-
regional arrangement for marine oil pollution control covering Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe, was 
suspended partly due to failure of the member states to pay their 
assessments to a Trust Fund for that purpose. 166 
The economic policies of West African countries also play a role. 
Because of their desire to catch up with the rest of the world, these 
countries are often unmindful of the environmental implications of their 
development aspirations. Thus, one has observed: 
Indeed, foundational to the success of marine regionalism for 
purposes of pollution control is the character of the national 
economic policies of each participating State, especially of the 
coastal States ... African States favour economic development 
over ecological preservation. 167 
Policy reformulation is necessary in West African countries. It is 
dangerous for developing countries to be obsessed with economic 
development to the exclusion of environmental protection. 168 Moreover, 
the trend in the global community is toward an understanding that 
economic development and environmental protection are not mutually 
exclusive, as encapsulated in the concept of sustainable development, 
164. Id. art. 5. 
165. See Jackson Urges Liberians to Bury the Hatchet, AfricaNews Online (February 12, 1998) 
<http://www.africanews.orglusafricalstoriesI19980212_feat4.html> . 
166. See Dzidzornu, supra note 161, at 479 n.119 and accompanying text. 
167. Id. at 464. 
168. See Ambrose Ekpu, "Environmental Impact of Oil on Water: A Comparative Overview of 
the Law and Policy in the United States and Nigeria, 24 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 55, 105-106 
(1995). 
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which emphasizes that "environment and development are not only 
interrelated but inseparable.,,169 
Moreover, developed countries are not necessarily more concerned about 
the environment, nor less concerned with economic growth, than 
developing countries,170 yet some of them were able to fashion a 
functional regional arrangement on port state control long before now. 171 
What is required, therefore, is a "comprehensive process of resource 
management, informed by ecosystemic knowledge and progressively 
integrated with economic development planning.,,172 
The advantages of a regional arrangement are legion. In the first place, it 
emphasizes a preventive approach to oil pollution which suits African 
states since they lack the technical resources and equipment to deal with 
any major maritime casualty.173 The importance of this cannot be 
overemphasized, considering that West Africa is a major tanker route 
and tanker-handling port facilities are located in all but six countries in 
the region. 174 Thus, the region is at high risk of pollution arising from 
tanker collision, grounding, loading and unloading, and offshore oil and 
d · 'd 175 gas pro uctlOn accl ents. 
A coordinated system of port state inspection would also go a long way 
toward minimizing financial costs incurred by individual state efforts and 
addressing the problem of substandard vessels. 176 West Africa is a 
marine-resource-rich zone that should be interested in their conservation 
and revenue through concerted pollution control and prevention 
169. Mickelson, supra note 5, at 42. The Brundtland Report simply defines sustainable 
development as "development that meets the needs for the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs." WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE, 43 (1987). It is heartening to note that the 1989 Lome IV 
Convention between the European Economic Community and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific 
States, as well as the 1991 Treaty signed in Abuja, Nigeria, establishing the African Economic 
Treaty, "emphasize the necessity of integrating environmental concerns with ecologically-rational, 
economically-sound, and socially-acceptable development." Aboubacar Fall, Marine Environmental 
Protection Under Coastal States' Extended Jurisdiction in Africa, 27 J. MAR. L.& COM. 281,287 
(1996). 
170. See D. Westbrook, Environmental Policy in the European Community: Observations in the 
European Environment Agency, 15 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 257 (1991); O. Lomas, Environmelltal 
Protection, Economic Conflict and the European Community, 33 MCGILL L. J. 506, 508-510 (1988). 
171. Paris Memorandum of Understanding, infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
172. Jaro Mayda, Environmental Legislation in Developing Countries: Some Parameters and 
Constraints, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 997 (1985). 
173. Fall, supra note 169, at 283. 
174. Dzidzomu, supra note 161, at 469-70. 
175. Id. at 470. 
176. See Kasoulides, supra note 122, at 149. 
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measures.177 The fact that the years between 1991 and 2000 have been 
declared the decade for marine and coastal environmental protection, I 78 
made this period an auspicious time to introduce a regional port state 
regime. This newly introduced scheme, like those in other parts of the 
world, follows in the footsteps of the Paris Memorandum of 
Understandingl79 ("MOU"), discussed below. 
The Paris MOU provides a legal foundation for the cooperative efforts of 
a number of European countries concerning port state control. 180 Under 
it, certain categories of ships are targeted for inspection purposes. These 
include ships that may present a special hazard, for example, oil tankers 
and gas and chemical carriers as well as ships with recent deficiencies. 181 
A maritime authority is enjoined to avoid inspecting ships which have 
been inspected by the maritime authority of another state within the 
preceding six months, unless there are clear grounds for inspection. 182 
This avoids duplication of inspection exercises with the attendant costs 
on state revenue and maritime transport. 
When an inspection reveals deficiencies which are "clearly hazardous to 
safety, health or the environment," the maritime authority must ensure 
that the ship does not proceed to sea and "for this purpose will take 
appropriate action, which may include detention.,,'83 If the port state does 
not have appropriate repair facilities, it should allow the ship to proceed 
to another port subject to any conditions the authority deems appropriate, 
177. See Fall, supra note 169, at 285. Tuna can be found in abundance here. See also 
Dzidzomu, supra note 169, at 465 stating that the West and Central African region contains fifty-
five per cent of all of Africa's fish potential. 
178. Declared by the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment. See Fall, Id. at 287. 
The Memorandum of Understanding for West and Central African countries was signed in 1999 by 
sixteen countries. See David Ogah, IMO pleads for implementation of port control treaty, THE 
GUARDIAN, May 10, 2000; http://www.ngrguardiannews.comlmaritimelmr785004.html(Last visited 
February, 16,2(01). 
179. Done at Paris, January 26, 1982, reprinted in 21 I.LM. I. (Hereinafter Paris MOU). The 
Paris MOU binds the maritime authorities of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and Northern 
Ireland. The Russian Federation became a member on January 1, 1996. "Cooperating authorities" 
including the United States' Coast Guard, Croatia and Japan are also admitted. See IMO News 2/96 
available at <http://www.imo.orglimo/newsI296/summary.htm>. Port state control has been 
extended to other parts of the world including the Caribbean and the Mediterranean. See Ted L. 
McDorman, Regional Port State Control Agreements: Some Issues of International Law,S OcEAN & 
COASTAL L.J. 207 (2000). 
180. The MOU format adopted here is ostensibly a reflection of the intention of states involved 
to avoid binding obligations. This is accentuated by the fact that it was concluded among maritime 
authorities and not state governments. See Kasoulides, supra note 122, at 15 I. 
181. Paris MOU, supra note 180, § 3 (3). 
182. Id. § 3 (4). 
183. Id. § 3 (7). Undue detentions may, however, give rise to a claim for compensation. 
Kasoulides, supra note 122, at 158. 
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with a view toward ensuring that the ship can proceed without 
unreasonable danger to safety, health, or the environment- l84 The MOU 
also obliges members to cooperate in the detection of operational 
discharge violations. 185 
The MOU is supplemented by the 1995 Council Directive of the 
European Union, which went into effect on July 1, 1996.186 The Directive 
contains even more stringent port state inspection requirements and 
promotes detailed inspections of vessels from countries with an above 
average detention rate in the MOU database housed in Saint Malo, 
France. 18? The Directive also requires that the ownership of detained 
vessels or vessels that fail inspection be published in its quarterly 
publication. Since one of the major reasons for "flagging under an open 
registry is the ability to conceal ownership," this is a direct attack on 
open registries aimed at eroding the advantage it confers. 188 
This regional port state regime has come under attack from the 
International Shipowners Association ("INS A") which considered the 
inspections embarked upon as an illegal means of delaying vessels and a 
detriment to shipping interests. 189 Doubts have also been raised as to its 
effectiveness as a tool for eradicating substandard shipping and 
improving the quality of vessels vIsItmg European ports. 190 
Notwithstanding the criticisms, it cannot be denied in good faith that an 
arrangement of this nature is of considerable value in effectuating and 
enforcing international rules and is worth replicating. 191 To substantiate 
this, it may be noted that it was the effectiveness of the Paris MOU that 
led IMO to pass Resolution A. 682 (17) on "Regional Co-operation in 
the Control of Ships and Discharges" and to invite governments to form 
regional initiatives for port state control in cooperation with IMO.192 
184. Id. § 3 (8). Notification should also be given to the next port of call in the region, to the 
flag state and to other interested authorities. 
185. Id. § 5. 
186. Anderson, supra note 56, at 168. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. L. Buchingham, INSA Sees Inspections as Means of Illegal Delay, Lloyd's List, October 
25, 1982, cited in Kasoulides, supra note 122, at 175. 
190. Kasoulides, Id. at 162. 
191. /d. at 176-177. 
192. Hare, supra note I, at 578 n22. See also Shipping Safety in a Changing World, address of 
the IMO Secretary-General, Mr. William A. O'Neill, to the Hong Kong Shipowners Association 
Luncheon, March 27, 2000. In that address, the secretary-general looked at the rationale for the 
introduction of the port state control regime and its importance. He added: "IMO has encouraged the 
development of regional port State control systems as a means of ensuring that ships do in fact 
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3. Assessments 
Port state control obviously has advantages as an enforcement tool, some 
of which have been discussed in preceding paragraphs. In summary, port 
state control minimizes the need to detain ships in transit for arrest or 
inspection, as such actions may take place at any port in the vessel's 
scheduled voyage. It also reduces the burden on coastal states to police 
their adjacent waters, which in the case of developing states with wide 
economic zones may be severe, since coastal states can now be assisted 
by port states. Furthermore, this increases the number of potential 
prosecutors and could thus facilitate pollution control and circumvent the 
problems created by those flag states which are unwilling or unable to 
effectively exercise jurisdiction over their ships. Moreover, by offering 
increased control over polluters, it addresses the basis for the clamor by 
coastal states for extensive zones of enforcement jurisdiction.193 
Accolades have been heaped on this mechanism, especially in 
contradistinction to the previous regime of exclusive flag state 
jurisdiction. For instance, one writer refers to it as "the most effective 
cure of the malaise of the maritime industry.,,194 In a similar vein, in June 
1993, Roger Nixon, who has recently retired as the Chairman of the Joint 
Hull Committee of the Institute of London Underwriters, said: 
Flag states are just a laugh. You tighten up one flag state and 
another one starts. It is just ludicrous. You never get a lasso on 
all those different flag states. Most of the flag states are not 
serious players, they are just in it for the money. But port states 
have a serious interest in the quality of the ships coming in 
because of their local environment and because they do not want 
ships screwing up port facilities. I believe port state control is the 
best answer because ports have no axes to grind, no contractual 
liabilities or contractual obligations to the owner. If the port 
authority does not like [a] ship, they should have no problem 
about making it pretty damned public. 195 
While the merits of port state control are acknowledged, they should not 
prevent anyone from noticing its pitfalls, a number of which have been 
addressed earlier in this article. Indeed it would be naive to place a 
comply with the internationally agreed upon rules." Id; http://www.imo.orglimo/speech-
llhongkong.htm (Last visited August 20, 2000). 
193. A.V. Lowe, supra note 4, at 642-643. 
194. Hare, supra note 1. Footnote omitted. 
195. Quoted in Clarke, supra note 148, at 204. 
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premium on port state control as a complete panacea to oil pollution 
problems. Port states are more likely to protect the environment by 
proceeding against polluters when there are incentives to act. Therefore, 
except for pollution incidents that are directly harmful to it, a port state 
or a flag state would be reluctant to take enforcement measures 
concerning pollution on the high seas or in another state's coastal 
waters. 196 
Developing states obviously lack an incentive to vigorously participate in 
port state enforcement measures since their fragile economies cannot 
sustain a backlash from shipowners by way of a boycott. While a boycott 
would obviously mean lost revenue from shipping, it could actually 
amount to economic stagnation in the case of port states who do not have 
large shipping fleets and are virtually dependent on foreign ships for 
their exports. 197 For a country like Nigeria with a mono-cultural economy 
dependent on oil production and export, that would be a disguised 
suicide attempt in broad daylight. 
It has been acknowledged by IMO's Marine Environment Protection 
Committee on several occasions that "full compliance by ships with all 
MARPOL discharge requirements is contingent upon the availability of 
adequate reception facilities in portS.,,198 The need for concerted efforts 
toward meeting this contingency cannot be overemphasized, and until it 
is met, calling the port state regime a phenomenal success would be 
misleading. 
In recognizing the peculiar problems of developing states and the 
importance of reception facilities to the Convention's success, MARPOL 
73178 included the construction of reception facilities on the list of 
technical assistance projects that it urged developed countries to assist in 
financing. 199 A 1992 working group of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development ("UNCED") estimated that the cost of 
196. See Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, Marine Pollution Control: UNCLOS III as the Panial 
Codification of International Practice. 7 ENVTL POL'y & L. 71, 73 (1981). 
197. R. M'GoNIGLE & A. ZACHER, POLLUTION. POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 338 
(1979). The authors opine that "[t]he most serious [enforcement problem] has been the lack of 
interest on the part of the oil exporting states to inspect tankers in their ports." 
198. MEPC 27/5/3 (7 February 1989). Tanker owners have categorically stated that the lack of 
adequate port reception facilities necessitates violation of discharge limits. See e.g. MEPC 27 /5 
(January 17. 1989); MEPC 27/5/4 (February 15, 1989); MEPC 32110 (August 15, 1991); [MO. 
Tanker Owners Urge Increase in Facilities Accepting Oily Wastes, International Environment 
Reporter, March 8, 1989, at 130; Tanker Orders Contribute to Pollution, International Environment 
Reporter, October 10, 1990, at 428. 
199. MARPOL 73n8 supra note 9, art. 17. 
32
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 7 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol7/iss1/8
2001] COMPLIANCE WITH INT'L REGULATIONS 133 
installing oily waste reception facilities in developing countries would be 
US $560 million for the period between 1993 and 2000?OO This is 
definitely beyond such countries' means, as they are also saddled with 
other responsibilities and debt obligations. A centralized funding 
mechanism designed to offer such assistance would certainly help. It has 
rightly been pointed out that "whether noncompliance [with the 
requirements on provision of reception facilities] arose from an absence 
of capacity or of incentives, financial mechanisms could have overcome 
the problem, but IMO has never established a program to finance facility 
costs for developing countries.,,201 
In considering the importance to be placed on port state control, one 
should not lose sight of the fact, as IMO has also observed, that measures 
by port states "should be regarded as complementary to national 
measures taken by the flag states.,,202 Where there are no flag state 
measures to complement, the efforts of port states will amount to 
nothing. Thus, effective port state control is dependent on strong flag 
state cooperation. This takes us back to the flag state issue and its 
associated problems. Until the world community devises a system that 
dissuades flag states from indulging in activities inimical to the 
environment and encourages them to be actively involved in the fight to 
save the ocean environment and resources, the battle may take longer 
than anticipated to win, if it is won at all. 
Therefore, in the remaining part of this article, other areas will explored 
that might fine-tune and strengthen the port state regime and to help to 
induce flag state cooperation. In that regard, Section III below will 
briefly examine an alternative approach. 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
The primary players in international oil trade are oil and shipping 
companies involved in the transportation of the resource. The existing 
rules require states to enforce the law against them when they fail to 
200. Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, Protection of Oceans, All Kinds of Seas Including Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas, 
Coastal Areas and the Protection, Rational Use and Development of Their Living Resources U.N. 
Doc. NConf. l511PCIlOO/Add. 21 (New York: United Nations, 1991). 
20 I. MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 208. 
202. See 1M. Sinan, UNCTAD and Flags of Convenience, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 95, 103 
(1984). 
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meet the law's demands. However, if the companies take it upon 
themselves to act appropriately, we will not only have better laws, but 
the need for enforcement will be greatly reduced. 
This part of the article will discuss the activities of the business 
community considered inimical to international efforts and how a change 
in industry behavior can change the face of things in this area. To ensure 
that this change occurs, it may be necessary to have a binding legal 
obligation to do so. This part of the article is divided into two sections. 
Section A will discuss the role of the corporate sector, while section B 
will lay a groundwork for a norm of corporate behavior and its 
applicability to international law. 
A. THE ROLE OF OIL AND SHIPPING COMPANIES 
There is no doubt that the industry has made some positive contributions 
toward the control of oil pollution. For instance, it has been at the 
forefront of supplying IMO with information on adequate reception 
facilities in states. In 1983, 1985, and 1990, the International Chamber of 
Shipping ("ICS") carried out a survey on ship masters and summarized 
captains' complaints regarding ports where reception facilities were 
absent, had limited capacity, were costly to use, or required long delays; 
an undertaking that was successfu1.203 
In general, however, the activities of the industry have been geared 
toward favoring its own cause, even when its course of action might 
place the overall interest of humanity in jeopardy. The activities of the 
business community founded upon profit maximization manifests as an 
inordinate desire to amass wealth at the expense of the health and well 
being of humanity. To the industry, resistance to any regulation that 
would increase costs is a virtue.204 This is accentuated by the fact that oil 
and shipping interests have been quite visible in coordinating domestic-
level lobbying to influence ppsitions that governments bring to 
international oil pollution negotiations.205 
It is also this quest for safeguarding their economic interests at the 
expense of everything else that informed the reluctance of the industry to 
apply adequate technologies that would best address the problem of 
pollution from ships. Contrary to the views of an industry 
203. MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 129. 
204. Id. at 110. 
205. /d. at 111. 
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spokesperson206 that the industry has made enormous contributions to the 
reduction of operational oil pollution, for instance, by introducing 
technologies, it has been revealed that the industry'S attitude had been 
one of frustration with international efforts, acting only when it would 
suit them. In their seminal work, Pollution, Politics, and International 
Law, R. Michael M'Gonigle and Mark Zacher presented the grim picture 
in the following words: 
The entire process of technical standards since 1954 reflects the 
constraints imposed by a dependence on technologies which 
have been developed and made public by the shipping and oil 
industries. The 1954 and 1962 discharge regulations for non-
tankers were, in effect, emasculated because the necessary 
technologies were supposedly unavailable. Meanwhile, the 
industry kept its own "load-on-top" system for tankers under 
wraps until it - and not governments or IMCO - decided to unveil 
it. This was also to an extent the case with crude-oil-washing, a 
system which had been considered as early as 1967 but was 
rejected as "uneconomical." Only when its use became profitable 
after the OPEC price rise was the system touted for its 
environmental advantages. Even then the oil industry supported 
it as a mandatory requirement only as a way to rebut the more 
expensive proposal for the retrofitting of segregated ballast 
tanks?07 
The practice of flags of convenience shipping also owes its genesis and 
sustenance to multinational oil and shipping companies who see in it an 
avenue for enhancing their business interests. As one writer observes, a 
"typical group of [open registry] firms will include oil and other 
multinational companies that they manage and that operate their tonnage 
with the primary objective of minimizing ocean transport costs and 
maximising profit.,,2o This practice, as already shown in the earlier part 
of this section, is a significant contributor to environmental degradation 
through international oil transactions as well as to the low level of 
compliance with international rules by some states.209 
206. DAVID ABECASSIS, OIL POLLUTION FROM SHIPS 42 (1978). 
207. See M'GoNIGLE ET AL., supra note 197, at 262. 
208. See George Kasoulides, The 1986 United Nations Convention on the Conditions for the 
Registration of Vessels and the Question of Open Registry, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 565 (1989). 
209. See Part IT, section A above, especially pages 14,19 - 21. 
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In view of the foregoing, this writer is of the opinion that if corporations 
are made to readjust their practices and behave in an environmentally 
desirable way, the problems of ocean pollution and enforcement of laws 
will belong to the dustbins of history. It is with that in mind that a case is 
stated in the next section for a binding international norm of corporate 
behavior. 
B. CHANGES IN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 
A code of multinational corporate behavior should be premised on the 
traditional notion of corporate social responsibility and the progressive 
movement toward corporate accountability. 
The concept of social responsibility demands that the interest of society 
be taken into consideration in a company's decisions, actions and 
operations.210 This implies a duty to incorporate ethical values in 
business and to contribute positively toward the welfare of the general 
pUblic.2I1 It refers to "the assumption of responsibilities by companies, 
whether voluntarily or by virtue of statute, in discharging socio-
economic obligations in society.,,212 
The traditional notion is that the business of business is to make money 
and a company is a vehicle for profit maximization for its members and 
does not owe any responsibility to other persons including the society as 
a whole.2i3 It is thought that through profit maximization, a company 
makes its optimal contributions to society's welfare. 214 This 
"fundamentalist" approach to the role of the corporation is flawed. It 
emphasizes roles and functions instead of capabilities. If a corporation is 
able to assume other roles in society, it would be wrong to shy away 
from that simply because its function has been compartmentalized into 
maximizing profits only. When every member of society does that which 
he or she is capable of doing, society receives optimal benefits.215 
Moreover, times change and corporate law is not immune from the winds 
of change. The fact that companies were originally created for 
210. Sita C. Amba-Rao, Multinational Corporate Social Responsibility, Ethics, Intentions and 
Third World Governments: An Agendafor the 1990s, 1. OF Bus. ETHICS 553, 554 (1993). 
211. Moses L. Pava, The Talmudic Concept of "Beyond the Letter of the Law": Relevance to 
Business Social Responsibilities, 151. Bus. ETHICS 941 (1996). 
212. SALEEM SHEIKH, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES: LAW AND PRACTICE I (1996). 
213. See generally, MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 et seq. (2d ed 1982). 
214. This sentiment is captured in Milton Friedman's often quoted statement: "The Social 
Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits," NEW YORK TIMES [Magazine] September 13, 
1970, at 32. 
215. LEE PRESTON AND lAMES POST, PRIVATE MANAGEMENT AND PuBLIC POLICY 31 (1975). 
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maximizing profits does not impugn the point that their role could be 
restructured to accommodate social objectives. 
Furthermore, in the normal routine of business, a company benefits from 
certain facilities and public goods for which it does not pay, even though 
they enhance its profit-making ability. Examples include good roads, 
oceans for transportation, a stable and peaceful society, and educational 
institutions funded or supported by other segments of society. 
Schumacher notes that "large amounts of public funds have been and are 
being spent on what is generally called the "infrastructure," and the 
benefits go largely to private enterprise free of charge.,,216 
The growing consensus at the moment appears to be that in their 
economic transactions, corporations should act ethically and assume 
some responsibility for social welfare.217 This is not only important but 
inevitable. If companies fail to assume non-profit obligations, people will 
be disenchanted with them218 and the whole concept of free market 
economics upon which unrestricted profit maximization is founded.219 
Writing for the industry, Alfred Farha asserts that a "corporation 
certainly is in business to earn profits for its owners or shareholders in 
accordance with the precepts of the free enterprise system: At the same 
time, though, a corporation can be a responsible and productive member 
of the society it serves. The fact is that a company cannot continue to 
exist without being profitable, and without exercising its responsibilities 
to society" ?20 
It is pertinent to note that multinational and other corporations have 
incorporated corporate social responsibility into their policies and 
practices. These have been pursued in some cases through self-
regulatory, non-binding codes, examples of which include the 
International Chamber of Commerce's Environmental Guidelines for 
World Business and Business Charter for Sustainable Development, the 
216. E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEoPLE MATIERED 257 
(1973). 
217. Amba-Rao, supra note 210. 
218. John Carson and George Steiner, Measuring Social Performance: The Corporate Social 
Audit, C. E. D., 1974 at 16, cited in Howard F. Sohn, Prevailing Rationales in the Corporate Social 
Responsibility Debate, 1 1. Bus. ETHICS 139, 144 (1982). 
219. H.J. Glasbeek, The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement - The Latest in Maginot 
Lines to Save Capitalism, 11 DALHOUSIE L. J. 363 (1988). Prof Glasbeek, writing from an 
ideological left wing position, sees corporate social responsibility's agenda as that of continued 
legitimation of capitalist liberal democracy. Id. at 368. 
220. Alfred S. Farha, The Corporate Conscience and Environmental Issues: Responsibility of 
the Multinational Corporation, \0 NW. J.INT'L L. & Bus. 379, 381 (1989). 
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U.S. and Canadian Chemical Manufacturers Association's Responsible 
Care Program, the European Council of Chemical Manufacturers 
Federation's Principles and Guidelines for the Safe Transfer of 
Technology, and the Japanese Business Council (Keidanren) Global 
Environmental Charter.221 
While these efforts are commendable, their weakness sterns from the fact 
that these codes "offer no mechanism for ensuring compliance a~art from 
those which exist in any event, such as adverse publicity." 22 Thus, 
notwithstanding the improvements they have brought to the attitude of 
multinational companies toward the environment, "it is an enormous act 
of faith to trust almost entirely in self-regulation . . .,,223 A legal 
formulation to back the above policies is therefore necessary.224 
At the moment, such a legal framework exists in some measure at the 
domestic level in some countries.225 Because of the nature and structure 
of multinational corporations, it would be more appropriate to bring them 
under international control.226 This notion is premised on the "economic 
power of multinationals, the international character of multinational 
corporations, and the limited ability of Third World countries to regulate 
the activities of multinationals.,,227 These types of companies have 
grown beyond the control of most national governments and operates in 
a legal and moral vacuum where individualism is the cardinal rule.228 
221. See Robert J. Fowler, International Environmental Standards for Transnational 
Corporations, 25 ENVTL. L. I, 29 (1995). 
222. ld. 
223. [d. 
224. Studies conducted by two environmental groups, Friends of the Earth and Public Data 
Project, indicate that American multinational corporations involved in chemical manufacturing in 
Europe were not willing to release data on toxic emissions unless they were legally required to do so, 
notwithstanding that 12 of the companies are members of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, 
which requires its members to subscribe to its Responsible Care Program. See Melissa S. Padgett, 
Environmental Health and Safety - International Standardization of Right-to-Know Legislation in 
Response to Refusal of United States Multinationals to Publish Toxic Emissions Data for the United 
Kingdom Facilities, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 701 (1992). 
225. At least 27 states in the United States, including Connecticut, Indiana and Delaware, have 
legislation along those lines. See David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REv. 223 
(1991). 
226. By the early 199Os, multinational corporations in the world numbered up to 37,000, with 
tremendous influence on the global economy. In 1990, the worldwide outflow of foreign direct 
investment ("FD!"), which measures the productive capacity of multinationals, totalled US $234 
billion. By 1992, the stock of FDI had risen to US $2 trillion. Parent multinationals have generated 
some 170,000 foreign affiliates. Fowler, supra note 221. 
227. Matthew Lippman, Transnational Corporations and repressive regimes: The Ethical 
Dilemma, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 542, 544 (1985). Lippman argues for direct regulation of 
multinationals by intemationallaw. 
228. See Fowler, supra note 221, at 2 
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The situation is even worse in the case of developing countries which, in 
their quest and scramble for economic investments of multinational 
companies, are too enfeebled to regulate or control the multinationals. 
Indeed, the companies are more likely to show a preference for those 
countries with lax regulations over multinational business activity.229 The 
absence in developing countries of the technical expertise and legal 
development necessary to monitor or regulate complex activities such as 
environmental pollution also militates against any efforts by these 
countries to control the activities of multinational corporations. 230 
The closest international law has come to imposing duties akin to social 
responsibility on multinational corporations was through a series of draft 
codes. Efforts by members of the United Nations to agree on a non-
binding code of conduct for multinational corporations met with 
persistent failure until they were abandoned in 1993.231 The 1988 Draft 
Code contains the most recent provision relating to environmental 
protection. It provides: 
Transnational corporations shall carry out their activities in 
accordance with national laws, regulations, established 
administrative practices and policies relating to the preservation 
of the environment of the countries in which they operate and 
with due regard to relevant international standards. Transnational 
corporations should, in performing their activities, take steps to 
protect the environment and where damaged to rehabilitate it and 
should make efforts to develop and apply adequate technologies 
for this purpose.232 
The danger with provisions couched in such language is that they could 
represent mere moral adjurations honored more in the breach than in the 
observance. One writer has pointed out that the problem with hortatory 
provisions is that they do not "compel business leaders to address the 
larger problems of our society which corporations have either helped to 
create through their irresponsible conduct or failed to ameliorate by any 
meaningful philanthropic activity.,,233 Writing about Europe, Dr Sheikh 
contends that, for corporate social responsibility to be effective in the 
229. Lippman, supra note 227, at 545. 
230. [d. 
231. Fowler, supra note 221, at 3. 
232. U.N. Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR, Org. Sess., 
1988, Provisional Agenda Item 2, at II; U.N. Doc. FJ 39/Add.l (1988). 
233. Daniel J. Morissey, Toward a New/Old Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 
SYRACUSE L.REV. 1005, 1030 (1989). 
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European Union, it is necessary to create a compulsory regulatory 
framework applicable to all member states rather than relying on 
companies to undertake social responsibilities of their own volition.234 
Instituting a clearly defined, binding norm on corporate activities would 
go a long way toward ordering corporate behavior so as to facilitate 
companies' compliance with international regulations and reduce the 
burden on states to enforce them. It would also harmonize different 
individual efforts of corporations to contribute to the welfare of society. 
The thrust of such a norm would be the entrenchment of ethical values as 
a sine qua non in international business and the imposition of a 
responsibility to contribute positively toward societal well-being. Such 
contributions could be put into a common international fund and applied 
to needed areas. In oil pollution matters, this could translate into a 
mandatory payment by oil and shipping companies of a certain 
percentage of their profits for marine environmental issues. 
Two major problems confront this alternative: enforceability and 
acceptance by states, especially those keenly interested in protecting the 
interests of their corporations. On the issue of enforceability, the question 
arises whether states that were less willing or generally ineffective in 
enforcing international rules would suddenly wake up to embrace this 
idea and enforce it. A possible solution may be found in the 
establishment of an international judicial forum vested with jurisdiction 
to enforce such norms. This forum could serve as an international court 
for the environment.235 Such a court would be able to "judge," not merely 
"mediate,,,236 and would be structured in such a way as to allow 
individuals and non-state actors in the international realm (such as 
multinational corporations) the opportunity to sue and be sued. This idea 
is premised on the point that states, perpetrators of environmental abuses 
themselves, cannot be entrusted with the sole responsibility and privilege 
of enforcing environmental rights.237 
The reality, however, is that only a handful of individuals possess 
sufficient financial resources to institute an action in a foreign land. 
Considering the fact that many victims of marine pollution are local 
234. SHEIKH, supra note 212, at 210. 
235. Joshua Eaton, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational 
Corporations and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment 1997 B.U.INT'L LJ. 261, at 303. 
236. Amedeo Postig1ione, A More Efficient International Law on the Environment and Setting 
Up an International Court for the Environment Within the United Nations, 20 ENVTL L. 321, 325 
(1990). 
237. Eaton, supra note 235, at 305. 
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fishermen and farmers, the envisaged right could amount to nothing 
more than a hole in a doughnut, fanciful and beautiful, but useless and 
ephemeral. A way out would be for Non-Governmental Organizations 
("NGOs") to involve themselves actively and undertake prosecutions on 
behalf of needy individuals. 
For the effective discharge of its functions, the court would be granted 
powers to prevent and remedy injuries through injunction and 
compensation. A comparable standard is that under the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, which has the power to grant injunctive 
relief to obviate irreparable damage to individuals. 238 
The major problem with this option is the question of the enforcement of 
the court's decisions. In that regard, it has been suggested that the 
judgments of the court which award damages to an injured party, 
whether by default or by adjudication, should be enforceable in domestic 
courts.239 This idea is merely academic, considering that one of the 
factors that makes the international court concept attractive is the 
inefficiency of domestic courts in some places. If judgments still have to 
pass through this ineffective system, then the whole process and expense 
of going to the international court would be a huge waste and an empty 
rigmarole. 
Another way of enforcing decisions would be through an international 
police force. Nevertheless, this idea raises a number of hurdles for, 
notwithstanding that "most reformers in the field of international law 
have accepted the notion that the basic way of enforcing law is by a 
policeman, and that the way to improve compliance with international 
law is to establish an international police force strong enough to impose 
the law on any country,,,240 it has yet to gain the concurrence and 
acceptance of policy makers. Considering states' obsessions with the 
notion of sovereignty, it does not appear that they would embrace the 
idea any time soon. 
This leaves us with the option of considering enforcement of the 
proposed international norm through domestic courts. This in turn has its 
own problems. As earlier stated, the existence of an efficient judicial 
system is foreign to some states. Moreover, litigants have had 
238. Scott D. Cahalan, Recent Developments, NIMBY: Not in Mexico's Backyard? A Case for 
Recognition of a Human Right to Healthy Environment in the American States, 23 GA. 1. INT'L & 
COMPo L. 409, 415 n27 (1993). 
239. Eaton, supra note 235, at 305. 
240. ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (1981). 
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unpalatable experiences in the few instances they have mustered enough 
courage to bring actions against multinational corporations in domestic 
courts of some states.241 For instance, corporations are in the habit of 
employing the services of expert witnesses whose evidence cannot be 
contradicted by the often poor litigants who cannot afford the services of 
their own expert witnesses. 
Further, some states may decide not to be parties to the international 
arrangement or refuse to translate its provisions into local legislation. 
This will inevitably deprive their citizens of the opportunity of enforcing 
the rules against delinquent vessels. It may be worthwhile, therefore, to 
consider couching the norm in such a way as to allow actions against the 
vessels in any country in which they operate or which they visit. This 
may leave a sour taste in the mouths of the maritime powers as it 
represents an incursion into flag state jurisdiction. This leads us to the 
second major problem confronting an international norm of corporate 
social responsibility: acceptance by states. 
The international system is structured in such a way that state 
sovereignty is viewed with deference. It is a major paradox of our times 
that "[i]nternational law is based upon two apparently contradictory 
assumptions: fIrst, that the states, being sovereign, are basically not 
subject to any legal restraint; second, that international law does pose 
such restraints.,,242 
Because of the nature and structure of the international system, states 
choose treaty obligations which they assume.243 A state interested in 
protecting the interests of its ships would be less inclined to accede to a 
treaty that imposes high obligations on the shipping industry. This is 
particularly true, as we have seen earlier, of FOC states who are in 
business basically because they have lower standards and fewer 
restrictions which are attractive to the corporate world. 
241. See e.g., Allar Irou v. She/l-BP, Suit No. W/89nl, Warri HC 26111n3 [Unreported] cited 
in M.A. Ajomo, "An Examination of Federal Environmental Laws in Nigeria" in ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 11,22 (M.A. Ajomo & O. Adewale, eds., 1994). In that 
case, the plaintiffs application for an injunction to restrain the defendant from polluting its land, fish 
pond, and creek was refused. The court contended that nothing should be done to disturb the 
operations of a trade which serves as the country's main source of revenue. 
242. JOSEPH FRANKEL, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 23, (4th ed 1988); 
quoted in Gary L. Scott and Craig L. Carr, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of Customary 
International Law, 25 DENV. J.INT'L L. & POL'y 71 (1996). 
243. See G.M. DANILENKO, LAW MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 67 (1993). 
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It seems that the only solution, therefore, is to substantially restructure 
the international system in relation to the notion of sovereignty. An 
effective maritime pollution regime must involve a cession of a measure 
of sovereignty by states for the common good.244 The port state regime 
represents a step in that direction, but that does not foreclose further 
consideration of a reduction in flag states' influence and, accordingly, 
sovereignty. Mitchell comments that "[r]emoving these legal barriers 
often requires negotiating redefinitions of the boundaries and definitions 
of sovereignty. The new right of port states to inspect and detain tankers 
decreased the sovereign rights of flag states. Without fundamentally 
threatening the structure of the international system or current core 
notions of sovereignty, minor modifications can significantly improve 
enforcement in a given issue area.,,245 
It appears that the consensus in the international system at the moment is 
that the era is fast receding when it was thought that membership in the 
international community conferred enormous rights and virtually no 
responsibility.246 In the light of that understanding, sovereign rights of 
states have been encroached on when it was thought that the states 
involved had lost the ability or inclination to address actions for which 
they were ordinarily responsible and which impact the global 
community. This provides an explanation for the current scenario in 
international war crimes247 and high seas fishing. 
The Osaka Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, concluded in 1995,248 broke new 
ground as the first global instrument to establish a framework procedure 
allowing non-flag states to board and inspect fishing vessels of another 
state on the high seas. It "constitutes the global legal basis for permitting 
the inspecting state to bring a suspected vessel to a port for further 
244. Dempsey, supra note 42, at 561. "The common, long-tenn interest of humanity must first 
develop an ingenuity and influence surpassing that of national sovereignty before vessel-source 
pollution can be effectively controlIed." 
245. MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 323. 
246. See John A. Perkins, "The Changing Foundations of International Law: From State 
Consent to State Responsibility, 15 B.U.INT'L L.J. 433 (1997). 
247. [d. at 442-43. Despite the objections of the United States and others on the ground of 
sovereignty, an international criminal court treaty was concluded recently in Rome, Italy. See Mike 
Trickey, U.S. Balks as World Court Wins Approval, EDMONTON JOURNAL, July 18, 1998, at A4. The 
U.S. has now signed on to the treaty, though it has not ratified it yet. See Clinton's Words: 'The 
Right Action,' NEW YORK TIMES, January I, 2001, <http://archives.nytimes.com> (last visited 
February 26, 2001). 
248. U.N. Doc. NConf. 164/37 [Hereinafter Agreement). 
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investigation in case there are reasonable grounds for believing that it has 
committed a "serious violation," as defined in the agreement.,,249 
The idea behind the above model could be extended to oil pollution 
matters as it would help de-emphasize sovereignty and possibly enable 
actions to be brought against ships in other states to enforce international 
norms. The added advantage is that flag states would be propelled or 
compelled to live up to their responsibilities if they know that their ships 
would be without their protection and at the mercy of other states. Of 
course, it cannot easily be assumed that the introduction of this idea into 
high seas fishing would automatically mean that states would be 
favorably disposed toward introducing it to oil pollution control. 
In the first place, states have greater incentive to protect their fish stocks 
since they are revenue generators, and would consider it to their benefit 
to interfere with illegal fishing. The same cannot be said of pollution, 
which does not yield any direct financial returns, but instead costs money 
to fight. Nevertheless, the issues can be intermingled, an example of 
which is the involvement of states in anti-pollution measures in their 
territorial seas to protect money-yielding ventures including fishing. 25o 
The wide powers conferred by the Agreement on non-flag states and the 
reduced powers of flag states are quite feasible with regard to fishing 
because with fishing, cessation of the violation would, in most cases, 
remove the need for the fishing vessel to remain in the area. On the other 
hand, violations of pollution regulations are incidental to the principal 
purpose of maritime transport, and such exercise of authority on the high 
seas is therefore far less likely to be tolerated by maritime states.251 
From another perspective, high seas fishing is unique in the sense that it 
is an area in which there has been a great deal of regional cooperation, 
including agreement on the enforcement of regionally adopted 
measures.252 Moreover, it enjoys the full blessings of the Law of the Sea 
Convention, which encourages and even obligates such cooperation, 
especially with regard to the conservation and management of straddling 
stocks and highly migratory stocks. It was this interplay between 
249. Hayashi, supra note 20, at 27. 
250. E.g., consider the case of Greece which has strong incentives to prevent pollution in its 
territorial waters because of its fishing and tourist industries which are major contributors to its 
national economy. Accordingly, Greece has adopted a tough stance favoring port state enforcement. 
See Dempsey, supra note 42, at 499-502. 
251. See Lowe, supra note 4, at 642 n87. 
252. Hayashi, supra note 20, at 27. 
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regional and global agreements that provided an essential basis for the 
new enforcement mechanism?53 As regional efforts intensify in maritime 
oil pollution matters, the prospects of a similar arrangement seem 
brighter. 
In the meantime, though, judging by current developments in the 
international system, the prospects of acceptance of environmental 
measures that impinge on sovereignty are strengthening. There is an 
emerging notion that the environment is now the common concern of 
humanity, whose preservation transcends national interests. Commenting 
on this notion, Professor Brunnee has written: 
The notion describes threats to the well-being of the international 
community as a whole. One might argue that, as a result, all 
states have a legal interest in such issues and, in certain 
situations, an obligation to contribute to their solution. Seen in 
this manner, "common concerns" would limit state sovereignty 
in the interest of the international community - ultimately even 
where the cause of the "common concern" is located within the 
jurisdiction of a given state.254 
The bottom line is that the global community is becoming progressively 
compacted,255 and the idea of a global village is becoming increasingly 
realistic. It is even expected that the global village concept will soon give 
way to a new idea - the global family.256In such circumstances, it is clear 
that the old concept of state sovereignty is now moribund. 
It is therefore with great expectations that this article proposes the 
enforcement of an international norm of corporate behavior through the 
use of domestic courts in states into which ships' operations extend. 
253. Id. 
254. lutta Brunnee, A Conceptual Framework for an International Forests Convention: 
Customary Law and Emerging Principles, in GLOBAL FORESTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 41,55-56 (Canadian Council on International Law, ed. 1996). 
255. Dr. C. N. Okeke, former Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the Enugu State University of Science 
and Technology, Nigeria, and currently a professor of International and Comparative Law at Golden 
Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, California, in a personal communication with the 
author. 
256. Arthur Clarke, quoted in Hans Zimmermann, Emergency Telecommunications: 
Telecommunications in the Service of Humanitarian Assistance, unpublished paper (on file with 
author). 
45
Duruigbo: Compliance with Int'l Regulations
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
146 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 7:1 
V. CONCLUSION 
Methods of states' compliance with and enforcement of international 
regulations have, for some time now, presented real obstacles to 
realization of the fruits of long deliberations from which international 
regulations emerge. International law has devised various means of 
surmounting these problems including the traditional approaches of flag, 
coastal, and port states' jurisdiction. These measures have been 
somewhat effective, although some loopholes are noticeable. In recent 
times, modem mechanisms of influencing states' and corporate behavior 
have also emerged. While they may not present a panacea to these 
multifaceted problems, they are likely to contribute substantially to an 
improved state of affairs, especially if merged with traditional methods. 
Nevertheless, the problem of rational beings' inclination to act in their 
own interests remains a major challenge to improving such behavior. 
Thus, ih many cases states exhibit an inclination to cooperate only with 
regimes favorable to them. A realistic approach that considers this 
inclination while formulating legal rules is essential. 
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